The Dark (and Bright) Side of IoT: Attacks and Countermeasures to
  Identification of Smart Home Devices and Services by Hussain, Ahmed Mohamed et al.
The Dark (and Bright) Side of IoT: Attacks and
Countermeasures to Identification of Smart
Home Devices and Services?
Ahmed Mohamed Hussain1, Gabriele Oligeri2, and Thiemo Voigt1
1 Department of Information Technology, Uppsala University, Uppsala, Sweden
2 Division of Information and Computing Technology (ICT),
College of Science and Engineering (CSE),
Hamad bin Khalifa University (HBKU)
Abstract. We present a new machine learning-based attack that ex-
ploits network patterns to detect the presence of smart IoT devices and
running services in the WiFi radio spectrum. We perform an extensive
measurement campaign of data collection, and we build up a model de-
scribing the traffic patterns characterizing three popular IoT smart home
devices, i.e., Google Nest, Google Chromecast, Amazon Echo, and Ama-
zon Echo Dot. We prove that it is possible to detect and identify with
overwhelming probability their presence and the services running by the
aforementioned devices in a crowded WiFi scenario. This work proves
that standard encryption techniques alone are not sufficient to protect
the privacy of the end-user, since the network traffic itself exposes the
presence of both the device and the associated service. While more work
is required to prevent non-trusted third parties to detect and identify
the user’s devices, we introduce ”Eclipse”, a technique to mitigate these
types of attacks, which reshapes the traffic making the identification of
the devices and the associated services like a random guess.
Keywords: Internet of Things · Machine Learning · Security · Privacy
· Cyberphysical Systems
1 Introduction
Security and privacy of communications are of paramount importance given the
growing number of user devices connected to the Internet. Indeed, the number of
smart devices is exponentially growing around the world, and the vast majority
of today’s network traffic is encrypted to guarantee the security and privacy
of the communications. eMarketer [1] anticipates that Amazon will continue to
dominate the smart speaker market also this and next year. This year, Amazon’s
smart speakers such as Amazon Echo and Echo Dot lead the market with nearly
? This publication was made possible by NPRP grants NPRP12S-0125-190013 from
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69.7% of the market users, while 31.7% of users are expected to use Google smart
speakers.
Recently, encrypted network traffic classification has emerged as a technique
to detect and identify traffic patterns although being anonymized by one or more
encryption layers [2–4]. The same techniques have been successfully adopted for
drones [5] and cryptojacking detection [6].
The main idea behind traffic classification is to characterize the network
traffic flow according to statistical features independently of the information
that can be retrieved from the packet headers, such as network and physical layer
addresses. Standard features can be packet size and interarrival times between
consecutive packets, while more advanced features take into account statistics
such as mean and variance computed over sequences of consecutive packets.
While HTTPS and VPN services protect the end user from adversaries willing
to exfiltrate information from the content of the packet, traffic patterns are very
difficult to hide without affecting services’ performance. Moreover, the wireless
scenarios considered in this paper make such attacks even more effective and
efficient. Indeed, due to its intrinsic broadcast nature, wireless communications
can be easily eavesdropped without the consent of the user, and an adversary can
exploit the traffic pattern generated by users to infer either the devices they have
at home or the services they are using. This presents major issues for the users’
privacy, not just because non-trusted third parties can infer the user behavior,
but also detect the presence of specific devices to target in subsequent attacks.
Contribution. We propose a methodology based on machine learning classifi-
cation to detect and identify the presence of smart devices in the WiFi radio
spectrum. We tested our approach against three different smart devices, i.e.,
Google Nest, Google Chromecast, Amazon Echo and Amazon Echo Dot, and
three popular services, i.e., Music, YouTube and News streaming. We proved
that the aforementioned devices and services are affected by a critical privacy
leakage since they allow not-authorized third parties to detect their presence
even in the case of standard multi-layer encrypted streams such as WPA and
HTTPS. This paper proves that the most commonly used smart devices in the
market and their related services can be easily detected with overwhelming prob-
ability (> 0.99) from a crowded WiFi link. We provide deep statistical insights
about the traffic characterization, we show how standard machine learning tech-
niques can be used to detect the presence of the devices, and finally, we highlight
potential countermeasures against our attack.
Paper Organization. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Sec-
tion 2 summarizes recent contributions in the field of encrypted traffic classifica-
tion, while Section 3 illustrates our assumptions and the adversary model. Our
measurement setup and data collection procedures are introduced in Section 4,
while Section 5 introduces the statistical analysis and reports the performance
of our device identification methodology. Section 6 shows the results of our de-
tection algorithm when considering a crowded WiFi link, and Section 7 discusses
countermeasures against our attack. Finally, Section 8 tightens conclusions and
draws some future work.
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2 Related Work
Msadek et al. [7] proposed to fingerprint and map IoT devices to their associated
encrypted traffic flow using machine learning. They assumed that the adver-
sary is capable of passively collecting the traffic generated from the IoT devices
through monitoring the gateway or a compromised IoT device. The data-set used
in their analysis [8] constituted of seven different categories. The adversary in
their study is remote and capable of obtaining the bidirectional flows generated
by the devices. They reported the performance from five different classification
algorithms, where Adaboost [9] outperformed with 95.5% accuracy in identifying
the type of the device. However, their analysis did not focus on either applica-
tions or services these devices are running.
Shahid et al. [3] presented a machine learning-based approach to identify the
type of four different IoT devices connected to the network, by analyzing the
bidirectional flows. From the first N packets exchanged between the internet
and IoT devices, they extracted two features: packet size and inter-arrival times.
Devices were connected to an access point and traffic between the access point
and internet is redirected through a Raspberry Pi for capturing packets. Dif-
ferent supervised machine learning algorithms were used for classification, best
performance has been achieved using Random Forest with 99.9% accuracy. Their
methodology involves collecting the data from an intermediate communication
node (Raspberry Pi) and not directly from the wireless radio spectrum as we do.
Santos et al. [10] used a data-set that was collected within a smart cam-
pus [11]. The total number of IoT and none-IoT devices in this data-set is 18.
The considered features were maximum packet size in the forward direction,
source port, destination port, and average packet size. They were able to iden-
tify each device network traffic flow, with 99% of accuracy by using the Random
Forest algorithm. Even in this case study, the authors were able to distinguish
devices, but not the application run by the device itself. Sivanathan et al. [11]
considered a data-set collected over a period of three weeks, for more than 20
IoT devices such as cameras, lights, appliances, and health monitors. They ex-
tracted features such as data rates and burstiness, activity cycles, and signaling
patterns. By exploiting the aforementioned features, they were able to distin-
guish IoT from non-IoT traffic, furthermore identifying specific IoT devices with
about 95% accuracy. Similarly to previous related work, this contribution fo-
cuses on the device but not on the applications run by the device. Jackson and
Camp [12] investigated the performance of six different supervised machine learn-
ing algorithms to infer information from encrypted TCP packets. They were able
to identify encrypted information/request3exchanged between the Alexa cloud
service and the Echo device by only looking at the request packets exchanged.
They adopted three different feature vectors: TCPtrace Features Vector [13],
Histogram Feature Vector, and Combined Feature Vector. They were able to
achieve an accuracy of more than 93% using the Random Forest algorithm for
each of the features vectors. Data collection set-up in this study involves an in-
3 Such as: ”Alexa, turn off the light”
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termediate communication node (computer) and not directly from the wireless
radio spectrum as we propose in this paper.
Trimananda et al. [14] developed a tool that fingerprints generated traffic by
smart home IoT devices when switched on or off, through analyzing the initial
exchanged packets. This solution is effective only at the startup process, while
it does not provide any guarantees when the eavesdropped packets comes from
an arbitrary point of the stream.
Different methods has been proposed in literature to prevent traffic detec-
tion, most notably: traffic and packet padding [15,16], traffic morphing [17], and
frequency hopping. These techniques do mitigate the traffic pattern, but mainly
focusing only on one feature (notably packet size). On the other hand, the Leaky
Bucket algorithm can be used to mitigate the pattern created by the interarrival
times by reshaping the traffic at a constant rate.
3 Adversarial Model
The main reason for performing this attack on the WiFi link, is due to the effec-
tiveness and how easy it is to sniff (collect) the traffic from the WiFi spectrum
between the access point and devices without the need to be connected to any
of the sending /receiving parties. In this attack, we are particularly interested
in services that generates Quality of Service (QoS) traffic, as it generates large
number of packets exchanged between the devices and the access point, unlike
switching on/off IoT devices.
Our adversary model features two essential characteristics: stealthy and re-
source constrained. Indeed, we assume that our adversary is able to eavesdrop
and collect 802.11 radio messages (WiFi) from a remote location, even far away
from the target user depending on the receiving capabilities of his equipment.
Figure 1 wraps up our assumption on the adversarial model. We consider a
general user case scenario, where the user enjoys different IoT/smart devices
connected to the Internet. The aforementioned devices provide different smart
services such as news reading and music streaming by resorting to the user’s
voice commands. The voice command is detected and processed by the smart
device, and in turn, sent to the cloud service. Subsequently, the cloud service
replies to the smart device with the answer that (in this work) consists of an
audio stream.
We assume the adversary is sitting far away from both the device and the
WiFi access point, but still, he can eavesdrop and collect the WiFi radio mes-
sages. In particular, our adversary model takes into account the stream of mes-
sages from the cloud to the device (ingoing flow). For each eavesdropped message,
the adversary records only the packet size and the time at which the packet is
received.
We stress that our analysis is powerful even in the presence of a user able
to anonymize all the messages, e.g., by sanitizing all the information related
to source and destination IP/MAC addresses. Although we recognize that this
will require the deployment of ad-hoc protocols able to guarantee the message
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delivery between the smart device and the WiFi access point, we do assume the
worst possible conditions from the adversary perspective, i.e., our adversary will
not resort to standard techniques to infer on the service/device such as port
scanning or MAC addressing manufacturer mapping.
User issuing a command 
Internet
Requests/Data
Requests/Data
/Action
IoT Device/s
Classified
83% 91%
Fig. 1: Adversary model considered in this work.
4 Measurement Set-up and Data collection
In this section, we introduce our measurement set-up by considering both the
hardware and the software tools we adopted.
Hardware–Smart Devices. Our smart home set-up consists of three smart
home devices: Amazon Echo, Amazon Echo Dot, Google Chromecast, and Google
Nest Mini. These devices are distributed in different places and connected to a
D-Link router (1200AC) via WiFi.
Adversary–Hardware. We adopted an Alfa Card (AWUS036NH) for captur-
ing the traffic by switching to monitor mode, and therefore, collecting all the
over-the-air data traffic.
Adversary–Software. We consider a standard Linux distribution (Kali Linux),
and the tools airodump-ng/Wireshark for collecting and logging the WiFi pack-
ets. Finally, we adopted MATLAB 2019b for data preprocessing and classifica-
tion.
Data collection. We would like to stress that we resort to MAC addresses
to select the traffic of the smart devices and generate the ground truth with
the machine learning algorithms. As it will be clear in the following sections,
the classification will be independent of the aforementioned information, while
being rooted only on features like packet size, interarrival times and statistical
computations derived from them.
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The data collection has been performed accordingly to the following proce-
dure:
1. We adopted airodump-ng to identify the victim access point and the devices
connected to it.
2. Identifying information such as MAC addresses and WiFi channel used by
the devices in the network.
3. Setting the Alfa card channel to the one used by the smart device.
4. Using either TCPDump or Wireshark for traffic collection and filtering out
the traffic generated from the access point to each of the IoT device. Using
the MAC address obtained from step 1.
5. Extract the time and packet size associated with each over-the-air message.
The traffic forwarded by the access point to each of the smart devices is
collected over approximately 8 hours of continuous news and music streaming.
In our set-up, we ensure that no other devices are connected to the network
other than the IoT devices. The total number of packets forwarded by the WiFi
access point to each device is approximately 280,000 for each service. In total, the
overall data-set size sums up to 1,680,000 packets of streaming news on amazon
echo and echo dot and streaming music on echo, echo dot, and google nest mini.
5 Data Processing, Statistics, and Device Identification
In this section, we provide the analysis, methodologies and techniques we adopted
for pre-processing and classifying the collected traffic.
Pre-processing. The raw reception times and packet sizes are extracted from
the traces. Inter-arrival times are calculated as Tx+1 − Tx, where Tx+1 is the
time of the packet x + 1 that is received after packet x. After this preliminary
computation, 8 different features are computed considering different window sizes
from the inter-arrival times and packet sizes.
Different statistical features have been adopted in the literature to uniquely
identify patterns from encrypted traffic [10, 12, 18]. In this work, we consider
8 statistical features: standard deviation, sum, variance, maximum, minimum,
mean, median, skewness, and kurtosis. These features are extracted by using a
sliding window technique, where a window of N adjacent massages is considered
for the computation of the aforementioned statistics.
Classification. Machine learning algorithms facilitates its capabilities to iden-
tify and distinguish unique patterns from the used features (interarrival times
and packet sizes), which result in identifying services and devices more accu-
rately. The vast majority of our results adopts the Random Forest algorithm
for all our tests being the best performer from related works in the litera-
ture [3,7,10–12,18]. We highlight that we consider other machine learning algo-
rithms (either supervised or unsupervised), and we report their performance in
a later section. In particular, we consider the following configuration for the ran-
dom forest algorithm: k-folds = 15, number of trees/bags = 30. All classes
have been balanced to ensure that the number of samples is equal among all the
traces.
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5.1 Interarrival Times Analysis
In this section, we show the performance of the random forest classifier consid-
ering only one feature, i.e., the interarrival time between consecutive packets.
For each device and service, we extracted and analyzed the inter-arrival times
as reported in Figure 2, which shows the interpolated inter-arrival times for the
three devices and two services (except Google Nest Mini running one service).
Although the samples have similar patterns, the interpolating polynomial func-
tions have distinct patterns meaning that each service on each device can be
potentially identified by just comparing the interarrival times.
10-5 100
Inter-arrival Times [Seconds]
10-6
10-4
10-2
100
Ev
en
t F
re
qu
en
cy
Amazon Echo Dot Music
Amazon Echo Dot News
Google Nest Mini Music
Amazon Echo News
Amazon Echo Music
Fig. 2: Probability distribution function associated with the interarrival times
(seconds).
Classification. We consider a naive approach and perform the classification
of the encrypted traffic by resorting only to the interarrival times achieving an
accuracy of about 33.59%. Subsequently, we considered the previously intro-
duced statistical features computed from the inter-arrival times using the sliding
window technique. The window size has been set between 20 to 340 packets.
Figure 3 (a) shows the accuracy of the random forest algorithm as a function
of the window size. We observe that the trend of the accuracy saturates when
it reaches the value of 200 being equivalent to about 80 seconds. We highlight
that we choose the shortest window size (with the highest possible accuracy),
in this case 200 packets, to guarantee the shortest detection delay. Figure 3 (b)
shows the confusion matrix for the previously considered five classes, i.e., Ama-
zon Echo Dot Music (ED Music), Amazon Echo Dot News (ED News), Amazon
Echo Music (Echo Music), Amazon Echo News (Echo News), Google Nest Mu-
sic (GN Music), while the total number of samples is 2585. We considered the
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Random Forest algorithm and the 8 statistical features previously introduced,
estimated over a window size of 200 samples.
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Fig. 3: Accuracy as a function of Window Size when considering only the Inter-
arrival Times. A window size of 200 is sufficient and leads to an accuracy of
84.5% (a) and Confusion Matrix (b) associated with Random Forrest considering
8 statistical features computed over a window size of 200 packets. The total
number of samples is 2330.
5.2 Packet Size Analysis
Packets sizes can be easily extracted and used directly for analysis (to identify
the existence of a unique pattern) and classification. Figure 4 shows the packet
size analysis as a function of the five classes considered in this paper. We observe
that the frequency associated with the packet size is very different among the
five considered categories, in particular when considering packet sizes larger than
800 bytes.
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Fig. 4: Probability distribution function associated with packet sizes.
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Classification. As a baseline scenario, we consider the Random Forest algo-
rithm and only the packet size feature. As for the previous case (interarrival
times), such configuration gives us very poor performance, i.e., the accuracy
achieved is 0.33. Therefore, we consider 8 statistical features computed using
the sliding window technique with a range between 20 and 340 subsequent pack-
ets. Figure 5 (a) shows the accuracy of the Random Forrest algorithm as a
function of the packet size considering different window sizes. The highest accu-
racy achieved is approximately 0.755, using a window size of 320 packets being
equivalent to about 130 seconds. Figure 5 (b) shows the confusion matrix for
the previously considered five classes, i.e., Amazon Echo Dot Music (ED Music),
Amazon Echo Dot News (ED News), Amazon Echo Music (Echo Music), Ama-
zon Echo News (Echo News), Google Nest Music (GN Music), where the total
number of samples is 1455. We considered the Random Forest algorithm and the
8 statistical features previously introduced estimated over a window size of 320
samples.
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Fig. 5: Accuracy as a function of Window Size when considering only the Packet
Sizes. A window size of 320 is sufficient and leads to an accuracy of 75.5%
(a) and Confusion Matrix (b) associated with Random Forest considering 8
statistical features computed over a window size of 320 packets. The total number
of samples is 1455.
5.3 Packet Size and Interarrival Times
In this section, we consider the combination of packet size and interarrival times,
by combining all the statistical features previously computed together, i.e., 8 for
the packet size and 8 for the interarrival time for a total of 16 values. As for the
previous cases, we consider the Random Forest algorithm and a sliding window
spanning between 20 and 340. Figure 6 (a) shows the accuracy as a function of
the window size considering a total of 16 features. The accuracy saturates to
the value of about 86 without any major improvement when the window size is
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becoming greater than 180 being equal to 80 seconds. While Figure 6 (b) shows
the confusion matrix associated with the performance of the Random Forest
algorithm when considering 16 statistical features computed from both packet
size and interarrival time as previously described.
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Fig. 6: Accuracy as a function of Window Size considering both Inter-arrival
Times and Packet Sizes. A window size of 180 is sufficient and leads to an
accuracy of 86.85% (a) and Confusion Matrix (b) associated with Random Forest
considering 16 statistical features computed over a window size of 180 packets.
The total number of samples is 2585.
6 Device and Service Detection in the Wild
While in the previous sections we focus on devices and services identification,
in this section, we show the performance of the Random Forrest classifier to
detect the presence of the considered smart devices and services running, from
a crowded WiFi traffic. The noise is collected from an environment where differ-
ent number of users are connected to the same access point. The noise includes
different types of packets, such DNS queries, ACK, ICMP, HTTP, HTTPs, QoS.
As previously considered, we start our analysis by providing a statistical descrip-
tion of the WiFi traffic we collected from a crowded place. Firstly, we faced a
class imbalance problem; indeed, the WiFi trace collected from the wild is much
larger than the one collected from the devices. In order to make the comparison
fair, we divided the WiFi trace in chunks of the same size of the trace collected
from each device associated with each service, once detecting the device type.
In the case of having two devices of the same type running the exact same ser-
vice within the WiFi channel, the classifier will match and classify both devices
to the same class. We applied the previously introduced methodology and we
trained a model to identify each of the 5 classes, i.e., Amazon Echo Dot (Mu-
sic), Amazon Echo Dot (News), Amazon Echo (Music), Amazon Echo (News),
Google Nest Mini (Music), against the WiFi collected from the crowded place.
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Finally, we tested the model with independent traces taken from the previous
5+1 classes of traffic. We run the classifiers on each chunk and we averaged the
final results. Table 1 shows the results associated with the detection of each of
the device/service previously considered assuming a window size of 180 samples.
We report performance in terms of True Positive Rate (TPR), False Positive
Rate (FPR) and Accuracy. Our results show that performance is striking and
our approach can easily detect a smart device and the associated service from a
generic encrypted WiFi link.
Table 1: Performance for Devices/Services detection
Device Service TPR FPR [·10−4] Accuracy
Amazon Echo Dot
Music 0.9988 3.4 0.9992
News 0.9996 7.9 0.9994
Amazon Echo
News 0.9996 2.7 0.9996
Music 0.9998 3.6 0.9997
Google Nest Mini Music 0.9995 9.2 0.9997
Table 2: Comparison of our approach with other solutions.
Ref. WiFi Devices
Only
Remote
Attack
Services
Classifica-
tion
Single
Direction
Flow
[7] 7 3 7 7
[3] 7 7 7 7
[10] 7 3 7 7
[11] 7 3 3 7
[12] 3 3 3 7
Our Approach 3 3 3 3
Comparison with other adversarial models. Other attacks introduced in
literature focus on using either raw or statistical features extracted from multiple
information’s found in the exchanged packets such as (but not limited to) port
number, packet direction, round trip time (RTT), inter-packet time (IPT), and
other none-encrypted information. Our attack only leverages the two aforemen-
tioned features, interarrival times and packet size. Table 2 shows the comparison
between our solution and the most representative in the literature in terms of
type of device, technology, connectivity, attack strategy and capability to clas-
sify the application associated to the eavesdropped traffic. We remark that this
contribution is the first to deal with encrypted traffic classification over a wire-
less link and considering only one flow direction, i.e., from the AP to the IoT
device(s). Previous work [11] considered the same problem but taking into ac-
count a wired link making their scenarios (wired) not comparable with ours
(wireless)—the wireless scenario being more challenging, indeed the adversary
can be stealthier since he might hide himself behind obstructions, while the radio
link is characterized by delays and jitters that make the classification process
more difficult, but as we proved in this paper, achievable with overwhelming
probability. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, other contributions do not
differentiate between services and devices, while in our analysis we provide the
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likelihood to detect a specific device, and subsequently, to identify the provided
service.
7 Our Countermeasure: Eclipse
In the following, we propose an effective and efficient solution to the aforemen-
tioned attack. Our intuition is that encrypted network traffic classification can be
made (arbitrary) less effective if the features characterizing the different traffic
flows are reshaped, thus becoming similar. Indeed, the performance of the attack
can be significantly mitigated if the adversary is not able to build a ground-truth
related to the device/service traffic. We propose a simple but effective solution
we name Eclipse. Eclipse is implemented in the WiFi access point as a proxy
between the Internet traffic (wired) and the wireless connections between the
WiFi access point and the IoT devices (recall Fig. 1). We adopt our previously
introduced classification methodology by taking into account 16 total features
(8 for the packet size and 8 for the interarrival time), considering a window size
of 180 packets.
Packet size reshaping. We consider reshaping the traffic by taking only into
account the the packet size, thus setting all the packet sizes equal to 1500 Bytes.
Interarrival time and packet size reshaping. We implement the traffic
reshaping for both the packet size (as previously discussed) and for the interar-
rival times, i.e., by introducing random delays in the packet forwarding. Figure 7
shows the classification accuracy as a function of the introduced (maximum) de-
lay. We observe how the overall accuracy drops from about 85% to about 20% by
rescheduling the packets with a (maximum) delay of 0.5 ms. We highlight that
training a new model with the reshaped traffic is useless since the features are
no more biased towards a specific class (traffic flow), thus making the training
(on the reshaped traffic) completely ineffective.
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Fig. 7: Classification accuracy as a function of the introduced (maximum) ran-
dom delay (a). The accuracy drops to ≈ 20% (random guess out of 5 classes) by
introducing at least 0.5 ms of delay, and Confusion Matrix (b) associated with
Random Forest considering the mitigated 16 statistical features.
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8 Conclusion
In this paper, we have presented a methodology to identify and classify popu-
lar smart devices and related streaming services by adopting standard machine
learning algorithms. Our approach is based on extracting and detecting network
patterns (features) such as packet size and interarrival times and the related
statistics. We prove that our attack is feasible and can detect and identify smart
devices with probabilities, about 0.99 and 0.86, respectively. We have proved
that, contrary to the common belief, multi-layer encryption does not solve the
problem of privacy, highlighting that smart devices require additional attention
to guarantee the privacy of the end-user. Finally, we proposed a novel mitigation
technique that prevents the identification of the traffic pattern by reshaping both
the packet size and the inter-arrival times. Our findings prove that reshaping the
packet size, e.g., setting all the packets to the same size, is completely ineffective
to hide the presence of a specific flow, while introducing (small) random delays in
the packet forwarding process makes the identification of the flow like a random
guess.
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